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Abstract 
 
This paper examines interconnections between law, politics and the quality of government in 
Africa. We investigate whether African democracies enjoy relatively better government quality 
compared to their counterparts with more autocratic inclinations. The empirical evidence is 
based on Instrumental variable Two-Stage-Least Squares and Fixed Effects with data from 38 
African countries for the period 1994-2010. Political regimes of democracy, polity and autocracy 
are instrumented with income-levels, legal-origins, religious-dominations and press-freedom to 
account for government quality dynamics, of corruption-control, government-effectiveness, 
voice and accountability, political-stability, regulation quality and the rule of law. Findings show 
that democracy has an edge over autocracy while the latter and polity overlap. As a policy 
implication, democracy once initiated should be accelerated to edge the appeals of authoritarian 
regimes.  
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1. Introduction 
 
A key issue in political economics is to understand how institutional arrangements shape 
policy outcomes. The effectiveness of development policies in Africa over the past decades has 
been contingent on the quality of government, notably: political governance (political stability 
and voice & accountability), economic governance (government effectiveness and regulation 
quality) and institutional governance (corruption-control and rule of law) (Fosu 2013; Asongu 
and Nwachukwu 2015). There is some consensus on the positive relationship between the 
promotion of democracy and outcomes in policies and institutions that are favourable to 
government quality (Fosu 2008; Kim 2014). Moreover some scholars believe that democracies 
have important effect on the degree of competition for public offices but otherwise have 
insignificant influence on good governance (Mulligan et al. 2004). Conversely, there is a stream 
of literature maintaining that autocracies are still much better in governance compared to ‘early 
democracies’ (Moyo 2013).   
The debate has been reignited in contemporary political literature with the emergence of 
China as an economic super power in spite of her system of government that is not consistent 
with Western-style liberal democracy (Asongu and  Ssozi 2016). This has led to a new stream of 
literature on the reconciliation of the Washington Consensus (WC) with the Beijing model (BM). 
Consistent with Asongu and Ssozi (2016), reconciling the BM and WC essentially builds on the 
debate over the precedence of rights (political rights versus economic rights) in stages of 
economic development. A balanced narrative has been documented by Moyo (2013). She has 
defined the WC as private capitalism, liberal democracy and priority in political rights, and the 
BM as state capitalism, deemphasized democracy and priority in economic rights.  According to 
the author, the BM or ‘economic rights prioritization’ should be considered in the short-run 
whereas political rights or the WC should be given priority only as a long-term development 
goal. The proposition substantially draws on the intuition that a burgeoning middle class is 
essential to sustainably hold governments accountable as well as to demand political rights (see 
Asongu 2016a).   
In the light of the above, without the building of a sustainable middle class, governments 
cannot feasibly be held accountable because the process of democratization may be hijacked by 
demands for economic rights. In such a scenario, votes of the electorate are very likely to be 
traded for basic economic needs like food and shelter. It follows that genuine political rights 
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within the framework of liberal democracy is incompatible with low income countries or nations 
at the early stages of industrialization. Moreover, the underlying reconciliation builds on the fact 
that the BM has delivered a burgeoning middle class within a historically very short period of 
time. The authors have further argued that liberal democracy per se was effective in the United 
States of America only about 170 years after independence, notably when the country had 
become industrialized. There is also an evolving stream of literature confirming the above 
discourse with a consensus that globalization has induced developed nations to be focused on 
political rights, as opposed to low-income countries which are more concerned with socio-
economic rights. This conclusion has been established in developing and African countries by 
Lalountas et al. (2011) and Asongu (2014a) respectively. Furthermore, confirmation of the 
precedence of economic rights over political rights in stages of development have been 
substantiated at continental (Anyanwu and Erhijakpor 2014) and country-specific (Kramon 
2009) levels.  
The above discourse is consistent with the longstanding debate over the influence of 
political regimes in government quality (GQ). The debate has fundamentally centered on 
whether democratic countries enjoy better GQ compared to their authoritarian counterparts. To 
this end, many theoretical initiatives have been developed to substantiate why democracies are 
more likely to enjoy higher GQ levels, compared to autocracies. Whereas there is some 
consensus on the edge of democracies over autocracies, the empirical literature is clouded with 
controversies. In essence, qualitative literature has provided exhaustive case studies depicting 
how corruption (GQ) has increased (decreased) with the advent of democracy. This is the case 
of: (i) many developing countries in Africa (Lemarchand 1972), Southeast Asia (Scott 1972), 
India (Wade 1985) and Turkey (Sayari 1977);  (ii) post 1990 communist countries like Russia 
(Varsee 1997) and (iii) many Latin American countries upon different waves of democratization 
(Weyland 1998). These tendencies have inspired a number of quantitative studies, with some 
confirming the contradictory relationship between democracy and corruption (Harris-White 
1996, 3; Sung 2004, 179). Some protagonists have articulated the existence of a non-linear 
relationship between democracy and GQ at the early stages of democratization. However, this 
negative impact becomes positive as democracy grows. Two explanations have been put forward 
and tested independently to elucidate this non-linear relationship: the time and level hypotheses 
(Asongu 2015).  
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Concerning the level of democracy hypothesis, it has been established using continuous 
measures of political-regimes that GQ is highest in strongly democratic states, medium in 
strongly authoritarian regimes and least in states that are partially democratized. Based on 
varying empirical specifications, this level-oriented or non-linearity position has been defined as 
either U-shaped (Montinola and Jackman 2002), J-shaped (Back and Hadenius 2008) or S-
shaped (Sung  2004).  With respect to time of exposure to or historically accumulated experience 
with democracy, Keefer (2007) has shown that younger democracies produce worse GQ than 
older ones. In summary, the general idea in this literature is that partial or young democracies 
perform worse (worst) than authoritarian (full or older democratic) regimes.  
In the light of the above, the intriguing debate on the impact of political regimes on 
institutional qualities remains open. Consistent with Rothstein (2011) the debate could be 
summarized in the observation of Diamond (2007) that: “there is a specter haunting democracy 
in the world today. It is bad governance—governance that serves only the interests of a narrow 
ruling elite. Governance that is drenched in corruption, patronage, favoritism, and abuse of 
power. Governance that is not responding to the massive and long-deferred social agenda of 
reducing inequality and unemployment and fighting against dehumanizing poverty. Governance 
that is not delivering broad improvement in people’s lives because it is stealing, squandering, or 
skewing the available resources” (199). The above scenario is most relevant to Africa because 
the April 2015 World Bank report on Millennium Development Goals has revealed that extreme 
poverty has been decreasing in all regions of world with the exception of this continent (World 
Bank 2015) despite two decades of growth resurgence (Fosu 2015a, 44) and processes of 
democracy.  
The present line of inquiry contributes to existing literature by advancing the debate 
within the context of African countries. In essence, we investigate whether African democracies 
enjoy relatively better GQ compared to their less democratic counterparts. The concept of 
governance is relevant in policy, politics and development for a plethora of reasons (Asongu 
2016b), among others: (i) success in project implementation (Denizer et al. 2013); (ii) causes of 
failing party democracy (Ikeanyibe 2014); (iii) understanding the determinants of belief in the 
promotion of democracy (Kim 2014); (iv) limiting internet and cyberspace abuse (Glen 2014); 
(v) the effect of term limits on services to constituencies by elected officials (Van Dusky-Allen 
2014); (vi) compared to autocraticies,  there is a positive correlation between ‘leader turnover’ 
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and the volaltile policy environement (Fails 2014); (vii) good governance as solid foundation of 
change in society (Beal and Graham 2014); (viii) improving quality of life by better resource 
allocation and government (Jakubow 2014), especially for the deprived elderly (Fonchingong 
2014); (ix) the politics and policies towards obtaining participatory governance (Waheduzzaman 
and As-Saber 2015) and (x) nations with more state intervention in religion experience lower 
governance standards (Tusalem 2015).  
The remainder of the article is presented as follows. The theoretical highlights and 
clarification of the concept of governance is covered in the Theoretical Highlights and 
Clarification of the Concept of Governance section. The data and methodology are discussed in 
the Data and Methodology section. The Empirical Results section presents the empirical results 
and discusses policy implications. The Conclusions and Future Directions section concludes with 
a discussion of future research directions. 
 
2. Theoretical Highlights and Clarification of the Concept of Governance  
2.1Theoretical highlights   
 There are two main streams of theories on GQ, namely the demand-side of GQ or 
culturalist theories and the supply-side of GQ on political institutions. As emphasized by 
Charron and Lapuente (2010) in the first strand on the culturalist theoretical perspective, political 
institutions are fixed and changes in GQ result from social preferences and values. Thus key 
players are ordinary people governed by cultural values who are instrumental in determining 
what sort of governance they need. The prevailing values of society urge citizens to mount 
powerful collective actions that put pressure on the elite to provide good governance. Different 
social demands cannot totally explain the observed level of government quality. It is also 
necessary to account for the supply-side. 
 On the supply-side, political institutions shape GQ. In this institutionalist approach, the 
preferences of actors following standard rational-choice assumptions are kept fixed and 
variations in levels of government quality depend on how institutions shape the incentives of 
individuals. This implies key actors are rulers from one particular type (or sub-type) of political 
regime. The demanders of good governance (citizens) play, if any, a minor role as inhabitants of 
a country are assumed to be hard-working individuals ready to develop innovative technologies 
if rulers deliver good institutions (and low corruption levels).  
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2.2 Clarification of the concept of governance 
 We engage this section in two principal strands, namely (i) definition of GQ and (ii) 
debates on the validity of GQ indicators.  Consisent with Asongu (2016b), various definitions 
have been provided for governance. First, Dixit (2009,  5) has defined economic governance as 
‘…structure and functioning of the legal and social institutions that support economic activity 
and economic transactions by protecting property rights, enforcing contracts, and taking 
collective action to provide physical and organizational infrastructure ’. Second, in accordance 
with Tusalem (2015), governance embodies regulatory quality, corruption, rule of law, political 
instability, and bureaucratic effectiveness. Third,  the concepiton and definition of governance 
has been improved by Fukuyama (2013) who has suggested four approachs via which GQ can be  
appreciated, namely: (i) procedural measures; (ii) capacity measures that entail both resources 
and the degree of professionalism; (iii) measures of output and (iv) bureaucractic indicators. 
Fourth, as far as we have reviewed, the definitions, conceptions and measures of GQ by 
Kaufmann et al. (2010) are the most widely employed in the literaure, notably  “ (i) Political 
governance, which measures the election and replacement of political leaders is approximated 
by voice & accountability and political stability/non-violence; (ii) Economic governance, which 
is the formulation and implementation of policies that deliver public commodities, is denoted by 
regulation quality and government effectiveness ;(iii) Institutional governance, which is defined 
as the respect of the State and citizens of institutions that govern interactions between them is 
measured by the rule of law and corruption-control” (Asongu and Nwachukwu 2015, 11).   
 We briefly devote some space to current debates  on the construction and application of 
the underlying GQ variables. According to Asongu (2016b), a plethora of criticisms have arisen 
on the quality of GQ indicators from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi. Fortunately, Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Mastruzzi have readily provided rebuttals to these criticisms in the scientific 
community. As far as we have reviewed, the most famous argument is by Andrew Schrank and 
Marcus Kurtz. We briefly discuss this  investigation in four main strands, namely: ‘measures and 
mechanisms’; a reply; a defense and a rejoinder.   
 First, the mainstream consensus that GQ promotes economic development has been 
questioned by Kurtz and Schrank (2007a) who have rethought the confidence entrusted in the  
GQ indicators on the one hand and a solidarity in corresponding growth-governance linkages in 
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empirical literature on the other. The authors have established that the Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi governance variables are problematic because they suffer from many deficiencies, 
among others: sampling adverse selection, perceptual biases and conceptual conflation with 
policy choices.  
Second, in a reply to Kurtz and Schrank (2007a), Kaufmann et al. (2007a)  argued that 
the discourse by the contending authors is  lacking in substance for  three main reasons. They 
showed that the claims on  biases in the perception-based measures in the GQ variables  are 
falsifiable, speculative and short of  empirical scrutiny. They provided empirical validity for this 
by showing that the short-term relationship between perceptions in governance and growth 
discussed by the competing authors is statistically fragile and conceptually flawed. They also 
dimissed the empirical underpinnings of the contending authors on the governance-growth 
nexus.  
 Third, Kurtz and Schrank (2007b) responded to Kaufmann et al. (2007a) with a defense 
letter  in which they  remarked that the  conceptual issues and corresponding concerns of 
measurement are profoundly engrained in the debate on the relationship between governance and 
growth.  
 Fourth, Kaufmann et al. (2007b) replied with  a brief rejoinder by reiterating on the lack 
of empirical backing for the criticisms advanced by Kurtz and Schrank (2007b). According to 
them the concerns about potential respondent baises are not entirely restricted to the government 
effectiveness dimension of GQ, but extend to other governance variables as well.  
 In the light of the above theoretical underpinnings, definitions and clarifications, the 
conception and measurement of governance employed in this study are consistent with 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi.  
 A  criticism to the use of the World Governance Indicators from the World Bank may be 
that they can be used interchangeably with democractic quality indicators because the 
Washington Consensus prioritises  the quality of democracy. While this criticism seems valid 
from the perspective of political governance, it is not within the  context of economic and 
institutional governance indicators. Accordingly, there is a strong linkage between governance 
and democratic quality within the framework of political governance. In other words, political 
governance is strongly associated with democracy because it is defined as the election and 
replacement  of political leaders. Moreover, not all dimensions of political governance (political 
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stability/non violence and ‘voice and accountability’) as measured by Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi directly reflect democratic quality. For instance, a strong dictatorship may enjoy 
substantial political stability with little or no ‘voice and accountability,’ whereas liberal 
democracies may enjoy strong ‘voice and accountability’ simultaneously with substantial 
political instability.  
Conversely, other dimensions of governance (economic governance and institutional 
governance) cannot be used interchangeably with democratic quality. This is because the 
conceptions, definitions and measurements of economic and institutional governances are quite 
different. Economic governance is the formulation and implementation of policies that deliver 
public goods and services whereas Institutional governance is the respect by State and citizens of 
institutions that govern interactions between them. The ideas above can be further substantiated 
with differences between the Washington Consensus (which prioritizes political governance) and 
the Beijing Model (which prioritizes economic governance). In the light of the foregoing, 
whereas political governance could be linked to democracy, it is not the case with economic 
governance and institutional governance. 
 
 
3.Data and Methodology 
3.1Data 
 We examine a panel of 38 African countries using data from the African Development 
Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank (WB) for the period 1994 to 2010. In line with Kaufmann et 
al. (2010), GQ dependent variables include: corruption-control, government-effectiveness, voice 
and accountability, political stability or no violence, rule of law and regulation quality. The 
Kaufmann indicators from World Governance Indicators are used because (i) of their wide usage 
in the governance literature and (ii) they are freely accessible. Other sources of governance 
indicators (e.g.the International Country Risk Guide) are not free of charge.  
Consistent with Yang (2011), independent variables are political regime indicators of 
democracy, polity and autocracy. Instrumental variables include: legal-origins, press-freedoms, 
income-levels and religious-dominations. These instruments have been substantially documented 
in the economic development literature (La Porta et al. 1997; Stulz and Williamson 2003; Beck 
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et al. 2003) and have been recently employed in the African institutional literature (Asongu 
2012).  
 In the regressions, we control for GDP growth, public investment and population growth 
in the first stage but not in the second-stage. The absence of control variables in the second stage 
has two justifications. First, from a theoretical standpoint, we need at least four instruments for 
the three endogenous variables to enable an over-identification restrictions (OIR) test needed for 
the assessment of the validity of instruments. Second, Beck et al. (2003) have followed a similar 
approach by not including all the control variables at the second-stage. The choices of GDP 
growth and population growth are consistent with Asongu (2012) whereas public investment is 
selected based on evidence from Asongu (2014b). The choice of the control variables are also 
constrained by the degrees of freedom needed for the OIR test at the second-stage of regressions. 
In essence given the number of instruments under consideration, including control variables at 
the second-stage would either result in exact- or under-identification: implying that the 
instruments are either equal to or less than the number of endogenous explaining variables 
respectively.  
 Definitions and sources of variables are presented in Appendix 1, while summary 
statistics are  disclosed in Appendix 2. A correlation matrix is provided in Appendix 3 while  
categorization of countries is disclosed in Appendix 4. Two insights are worth noting from the 
summary statistics (i) the variables are comparable from mean values and (ii) the substantial 
variations imply we can be confident that reasonable estimated linkages would emerge. The 
purpose of the correlation matrix is to limit potential multicollinearity issues.  
 
 
3.2Methodology 
 While political regimes shape the quality of institutions, the reverse effect is also true 
because constraints in institutional quality might affect the political powers in charge. For 
instance an investigation into corruption allegations by an independent investigation committee 
might unveil some very nasty aspects of government that could result in  a change in political-
regime, either by popular revolt or resignation of culprits within the  government. Thus, an 
important issue of endogeneity results from this fact and should be taken into account by the 
estimation technique to avoid biased estimates.  
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 Consistent with Beck et al. (2003) the paper adopts an Instrumental Variable (IV) 
estimation technique. IV estimates address the puzzle of endogeneity and thus avoid the 
inconsistency of estimated coefficients by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) when the independent 
variables are correlated with the error term in the equation of interest. The corresponding Two-
Stage-Least-Squares (2SLS) IV estimation method adopted entails the following steps. 
First-stage regression:  
 itit nlegalorigihannelPoliticalC )(10  itreligion)(2 itlincomeleve )(3                         
                               itompressfreed )(4   itiX                                                                  (1)                                                                   
Second-stage regression: 
 itit DemocracytQualityGov )(' 10  itAutocracy)(2 itiX                                (2)                                                                                       
In the two equations, X is a set of exogenous control variables. For both the first and 
second equations,  v  and u respectively represent the error terms. Instrumental variables are 
legal-origins, religious domination, income-levels and press-freedoms.  
 We adopt the following steps in the analysis: (i) justify the use of a 2SLS-IV over an 
OLS estimation technique with the Hausman-test for endogeneity; (ii) show that the instruments 
explain the endogenous components of explaining variables (political-regime channels), 
conditional on other covariates (control variables) and (iii) using an OIR test to assess the 
validity of the instruments by investigating whether they are correlated with the errors in the 
equation of interest. For the purpose of further robustness checks, we employ: two sets of 
instruments; robust Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors 
and Fixed Effects regressions.  
 
4.Empirical Results 
 This section addresses: (i) the ability of exogenous components of political-regimes to 
account for differences in GQ; (ii) the ability of the instruments to explain variations in the 
endogenous components of political-regimes and (iii) the possibility of the instruments to 
account for GQ beyond political-regime channels. In order to make these assessments, we use 
the 2SLS-IV estimation technique with legal-origins, press-freedoms, income-levels and 
religious-dominations as instrumental variables.  
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4.1Quality of government and instruments 
 Table 1 assesses the importance of the instruments in explaining differences in GQ. It is 
apparent that distinguishing African countries by legal-origins, income-levels, press-freedoms 
and religious-denominations helps explain cross-country difference in GQ. The instruments 
taken together enter significantly into all regressions at the 1 percent significance level.  
The following findings can be established. (i) English common-law countries have better 
levels of GQ, compared to their French civil-law counterparts. This is consistent with the law-
finance (growth) literature (La Portal et al. 1997; La Portal et al.  1998; Beck et al. 2003) and 
recent African law-development literature (Agbor 2015). (ii) With the exception of government-
effectiveness, the dominance of Christian nations over their Islam-oriented counterparts is not 
very significant. Conversely, the significance aspect is broadly consistent with El Badawi and 
Makdisi (2007). (iii) Consistent with Narayan et al. (2011), GQ increases with income-levels. 
(iv) Contrary to Vaidya (2005) and Oscarsson (2008), GQ improves with press-freedoms.  
 
4.2Political-regimes and instruments 
 In Table 2 we regress the political-regime indicators on the instruments and test for their 
joint significance. This is the first-stage (or requirement) of the IV estimation technique in which 
the endogenous components of the independent variables must be explained by the instruments, 
conditional on other covariates (control variables). Based on the results of the Fisher-statistics, it 
is established that the instruments are strong because in the presence of control variables the 
instruments jointly enter significantly into all regressions at the 1 percent significance level. 
Thus, employing underlying instruments helps account for cross-country differences in the 
quality and nature of political institutions in Africa. Like with the GQ-instrument regressions, we 
engage two separate regressions for each political regime dynamic in the presence and absence 
of control variables such that we have four regressions for each dynamic. The following findings 
are established. (i) Consistent with the law-finance(growth) literature (La Portal et al. 1997; La 
Portal et al.  1998; Beck et al. 2003; Agbor 2015), English common law countries have higher 
levels of democracy than their French civil law counterparts. (ii) Christian-dominated countries 
enjoy higher (lower) levels of democracy (autocracy) compared to their Islam-oriented 
counterparts. This finding is consistent with El Badawi and Makdisi (2007). (iii) In accordance 
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with Narayan et al. (2011), democracy increases with income-levels. Democratic institutions 
improve with press-freedoms: contrary to Vaidya (2005)   and Oscarsson (2008).    
 
4.3The Quality of government and politics  
Table 3 assesses two main issues (i) the ability of political-regime channels to account for 
GQ dynamics and (ii) the possibility of the instrumental variables explaining GQ dynamics 
beyond political-regime channels.  While the first issue is addressed by the significance of 
estimated coefficients, the second is tackled with the OIR test. The null hypothesis of this test is 
the position that the instruments account for GQ dynamics only through political regime 
channels. Thus a rejection of the null hypothesis is a   denunciation of the view that the 
instruments explain GQ dynamics through no other mechanisms than political-regime channels. 
The choice of the 2SLS technique is contingent on the outcome of the Hausman test for 
endogeneity. The null hypothesis of this test is the position that OLS estimates are efficient and 
consistent. Therefore a rejection of the null hypothesis confirms the issue of reverse causality 
(endogeneity) we highlighted earlier and hence justifies an IV estimation technique. The 
following measures are adopted to ensure goodness of fit and robustness of estimated 
coefficients. (i) Every specification is replicated using an alternative set of instrumental variables 
as disclosed in the second- and third-to-the last lines of Table 3. (ii) Robust HAC standard errors 
(Panel B) are used to check results of the 2SLS in Panel A. (3) Based on the outcome of the 
Hausamn test, the FE regressions (which assume that the explaining variables are correlated with 
the error-term) are used to further check the results in Panel A and Panel B. 
The first issue which is addressed with the significance of estimated coefficients could be 
summarized as follows, (i) compared to authoritarian regimes, democracies have a more 
significant impact on GQ dynamics and (ii) authoritarian regimes have an edge over Polity in the 
2SLS (Panels A and B), whereas both overlap in FE regressions.  Concerning the second issue, 
two interpretations are apparent. (i) The instruments explain government effectiveness and 
political stability beyond political regime channels.  This implies that there are other mechanisms 
by which the instruments explain GQ dynamics of government-effectiveness and political-
stability beside political regime channels.  
With respect to the other GQ dynamics, the instruments do not explain them beyond 
political regime channels. This implies the instrumental variables are valid and not correlated 
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with the error term in the equation of interest. In other words, the instruments explain the 
remaining GQ dynamics through no other mechanisms than political regime channels.  
 15 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. The quality of government and instruments  
  Control of Corruption Government  Effectiveness Voice & Accountability Political Stability Regulation Quality  Rule of  Law 
              
 Constant -1.219*** -0.260** -1.665*** -0.319*** -1.402*** 0.041 -1.614*** -0.572*** -1.156*** -0.169** -1.522*** -0.430*** 
  (-8.868) (-2.381) (-13.86) (-3.285) (-21.17) (0.404) (-13.01) (-4.119) (-15.57) (-2.016) (-19.95) (-4.846) 
 
Legal-
origins 
English  common-law 0.193*** --- 0.317*** --- 0.149*** --- 0.119 --- 0.335*** --- 0.347*** --- 
 (3.624)  (6.816)  (3.355)  (1.433)  (6.757)  (6.771)  
French civil-law --- -0.210*** --- -0.335*** --- -0.175*** --- -0.150* --- -0.357*** --- -0.377*** 
  (-3.778)  (-6.777)  (-3.325)  (-1.778)  (-7.033)  (-7.033) 
 
Religions 
Christianity -0.010 --- 0.098* --- 0.0312 --- -0.019 --- 0.036 --- 0.002 --- 
 (-0.179)  (1.892)  (0.619)  (-0.210)  (0.645)  (0.043)  
Islam --- 0.023 --- -0.085 --- -0.005 --- 0.023 --- -0.032 --- 0.002 
  (0.380)  (-1.533)  (-0.093)  (0.248)  (-0.563)  (0.045) 
 
 
 
Income 
Levels 
Low Income --- -0.183*** --- -0.272*** --- -0.022 --- -0.180* --- -0.068 --- -0.164*** 
  (-2.674)  (-4.456)  (-0.352)  (-1.839)  (-1.158)  (-2.633) 
Middle Income 0.335*** --- 0.467*** --- 0.116* --- 0.599*** --- 0.349*** --- 0.420*** --- 
 (3.984)  (6.346)  (1.672)  (4.613)  (4.510)  (5.258)  
Lower Middle  Income -0.119 --- -0.160** --- -0.030 --- -0.404*** --- -0.271*** --- -0.242*** --- 
 (-1.309)  (-2.009)  (-0.388)  (-2.762)  (-3.108)  (-2.687)  
Upper Middle Income --- 0.288*** --- 0.338*** --- 0.320*** --- 0.594*** --- 0.407*** --- 0.437*** 
  (3.217)  (4.248)  (3.769)  (4.292)  (4.856)  (4.923) 
 
 
Press 
Freedoms 
Free 0.835*** --- 0.912*** --- 1.632*** --- 1.118*** --- 0.791*** --- 0.929*** --- 
 (10.44)  (13.06)  (24.12)  (8.824)  (10.48)  (11.92)  
Partly Free 0.395*** --- 0.447*** --- 0.887*** --- 0.632*** --- 0.453*** --- 0.444*** --- 
 (7.115)  (9.213)  (18.76)  (7.140)  (8.584)  (8.158)  
No Freedom --- -0.505*** --- -0.563*** --- -1.071*** --- -0.759*** --- -0.539*** --- -0.567*** 
  (-9.368)  (-11.73)  (-20.99)  (-9.126)  (-10.69)  (-10.63) 
 
 
 
Control 
Variables 
GDP Growth  -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.008* -0.008* -0.006* -0.006 -0.001 --- -0.008* -0.009** -0.009** -0.010** 
 (-2.858) (-2.750) (-1.940) (-1.836) (-1.731) (-1.329) (-0.150)  (-1.914) (-2.073) (-2.095) (-2.276) 
Population Growth  -0.020 -0.054 0.050 0.015 --- -0.062* --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (-0.586) (-1.480) (1.620) (0.467)  (-1.791)       
Public Investment  0.041*** 0.041*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.015** 0.016** 0.047*** 0.048*** 
 (5.556) (5.387) (5.560) (5.301) (3.684) (3.057) (6.321) (6.367) (2.389) (2.404) (6.934) (6.688) 
              
Adjusted R² 0.475 0.430 0.601 0.549 0.742 0.655 0.409 0.387 0.499 0.471 0.569 0.521 
Fisher test 34.293*** 32.128*** 56.236*** 51.261*** 123.046*** 81.255*** 30.293*** 36.656*** 43.00*** 43.950*** 56.789*** 53.700*** 
Observations 331 331 331 331 339 339 339 339 338 338 339 339 
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%  respectively. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  
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Table 2. First-stage regressions  
  Democracy Polity Autocracy 
              
 Constant 0.150 -1.317*** 4.287*** 3.293*** -2.578*** -3.226*** 3.069*** 2.672*** 2.748*** 2.134*** 1.293*** 1.222** 
  (0.455) (-2.911) (10.27) (6.082) (-6.504) (-5.870) (6.025) (3.434) (8.204) (3.677) (3.158) (2.465) 
 
Legal-
origins 
English  common-law 0.660** 0.677** --- --- -0.029 -0.182 --- --- 0.710** 0.789** --- --- 
 (2.168) (2.163)   (-0.080) (-0.480)   (2.304) (2.557)   
French civil-law --- --- -0.897*** -0.951*** --- --- -0.314 -0.098 --- --- -0.600* -0.837*** 
   (-2.847) (-2.929)   (-0.817) (-0.241)   (-1.942) (-2.596) 
 
Religions 
Christianity 0.089 0.079 --- --- 1.167*** 1.038** --- --- -1.024*** -0.982*** --- --- 
 (0.275) (0.227)   (3.009) (2.451)   (-3.123) (-3.012)   
Islam --- --- -0.039 0.047 --- --- -1.094*** -0.799* --- --- 1.000*** 0.923** 
   (-0.117) (0.128)   (-2.663) (-1.771)   (3.028) (2.517) 
 
 
 
Income 
Levels 
Low Income --- --- 0.868** 0.292 --- --- 1.536*** 1.748*** --- --- -0.644* -0.951** 
   (2.297) (0.725)   (3.333) (3.439)   (-1.738) (-2.361) 
Middle Income 0.251 0.321 --- --- -1.406** -0.987 --- --- 1.590*** 1.295** --- --- 
 (0.508) (0.642)   (-2.373) (-1.624)   (3.175) (2.514)   
Lower Middle  Income -0.872 -0.392 --- --- 0.228 -0.213 --- --- -1.061* -0.744 --- --- 
 (-1.512) (-0.664)   (0.331) (-0.298)   (-1.818) (-1.270)   
Upper Middle Income --- --- 2.535*** 2.157*** --- --- 2.183*** 2.541*** --- --- 0.285 -0.561 
   (4.652) (3.853)   (3.284) (3.636)   (0.533) (-0.996) 
 
 
Press 
Freedoms 
Free 6.997*** 6.884*** --- --- 10.025*** 9.694*** --- --- -3.067*** -2.892*** --- --- 
 (13.64) (13.34)   (16.31) (15.47)   (-5.905) (-5.548)   
Partly Free 3.464*** 3.185*** --- --- 4.899*** 4.420*** --- --- -1.417*** -1.369*** --- --- 
 (11.00) (9.567)   (12.99) (10.94)   (-4.444) (-4.331)   
No Freedom --- --- -4.137*** -3.943*** --- --- -5.875*** -5.505*** --- --- 1.731*** 1.491*** 
   (-13.28) (-11.99)   (-15.46) (-13.53)   (5.667) (4.605) 
              
 
 
Control 
Variables 
GDP Growth  --- 0.020 --- --- --- -0.059** --- -0.047 --- 0.068*** --- 0.073*** 
  (0.977)    (-2.316)  (-1.627)  (3.164)  (3.214) 
Population Growth  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.423** --- 0.083 --- --- 
        (-1.998)  (0.501)   
Public Investment  --- 0.188*** --- 0.188*** --- 0.166*** --- 0.151*** --- --- --- 0.021 
  (4.658)  (4.501)  (3.390)  (2.885)    (1.334) 
              
Adjusted R² 0.381 0.412 0.329 0.353 0.433 0.449 0.363 0.375 0.087 0.105 0.072 0.098 
Fisher test 57.936*** 44.971*** 55.447*** 46.688*** 71.792*** 52.108*** 64.355*** 38.706*** 9.905*** 9.150*** 9.721*** 8.831*** 
Observations 555 502 555 502 555 502 555 502 555 555 555 500 
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%  respectively. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. 
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Table 3. Second-stage regressions  
 Panel A:  2SLS 
 Control of Corruption Government  Effectiveness Voice & Accountability Political Stability Regulation Quality  Rule of  Law 
Constant -1.320*** -1.358*** -1.514*** -1.559*** -1.259*** -1.308*** -1.467*** -1.522*** -1.375*** -1.421*** -1.701*** -1.758*** 
 (-8.349) (-8.307) (-9.550) (-9.548) (-10.39) (-10.41) (-7.390) (-7.383) (-7.635) (-7.584) (-7.881) (-7.820) 
Democracy  0.161*** --- 0.188*** --- 0.219***  0.218*** --- 0.184*** --- 0.216*** --- 
 (6.921)  (7.854)  (12.28)  (7.455)  (6.980)  (6.793)  
Polity  --- 0.166*** --- 0.194*** --- 0.225*** --- 0.225*** --- 0.191*** --- 0.223*** 
  (6.902)  (7.868)  (12.19)  (7.425)  (6.935)  (6.758) 
Autocracy 0.126** 0.301*** 0.151*** 0.355*** -0.0001 0.237*** 0.149** 0.388*** 0.149** 0.352*** 0.209*** 0.447*** 
 (2.131) (3.737) (2.665) (4.588) (-0.003) (3.888) (2.067) (3.884) (2.282) (3.874) (2.666) (4.103) 
             
Hausman test 79.840*** 78.886*** 146.66*** 147.026*** 298.878*** 298.677*** 55.324*** 56.080*** 148.124*** 150.231*** 145.491*** 147.314*** 
OIR-Sargan 5.916 5.796 11.368** 11.109** 1.156 1.285 9.496** 8.871* 4.727 4.247 4.671 4.048 
P-value  [0.205] [0.214] [0.022] [0.025] [0.885] [0.863] [0.049] [0.064] [0.316] [0.373] [0.322] [0.399] 
Cragg-Donald 2.212 2.198 3.094 3.097 2.213 2.200 2.213 2.200 2.198 2.185 2.213 0.210 
Adjusted R² 0.170 0.172 0.193 0.194 0.597 0.594 0.284 0.283 0.186 0.184 0.208 0.210 
Fisher  36.471*** 36.246*** 39.456*** 39.562*** 197.619*** 194.845*** 46.637*** 46.109*** 38.006*** 37.411*** 32.441*** 31.995*** 
Observations  362 362 352 352 370 370 370 370 369 369 370 370 
             
 Panel B:  2SLS with HAC 
 Control of Corruption Government  Effectiveness Voice & Accountability Political Stability Regulation Quality  Rule of  Law 
Constant -1.320*** -1.358*** -1.514*** -1.559*** -1.259*** -1.308*** -1.467*** -1.522*** -1.375*** -1.421*** -1.701*** -1.758*** 
 (-3.648) (-3.543) (-4.422) (-4.363) (-5.945) (-5.657) (-3.399) (-3.346) (-3.525) (-3.414) (-3.764) (3.679) 
Democracy  0.161*** --- 0.188*** --- 0.219*** --- 0.218*** --- 0.184*** --- 0.216*** --- 
 (2.812)  (3.455)  (7.104)  (3.456)  (3.134)  (3.138)  
Polity  --- 0.166*** --- 0.194*** --- 0.225*** --- 0.225*** --- 0.191*** --- 0.223*** 
  (2.755)  (3.430)  (6.692)  (3.394)  (3.045)  (3.087) 
Autocracy 0.126 0.301* 0.151 0.355** -0.0001 0.237** 0.149 0.388* 0.149 0.352** 0.209 0.447** 
 (1.094) (1.719) (1.616) (2.441) (-0.002) (2.278) (0.879) (1.677) (1.291) (1.969) (1.560) (2.169) 
Hausman test 79.840*** 78.886*** 146.669*** 147.026*** 298.878*** 298.677*** 55.324*** 56.080*** 148.124*** 150.231*** 145.491*** 147.314*** 
OIR-Sargan 5.916 5.796 11.368** 11.109** 1.156 1.285 9.496** 8.871* 4.727 4.247 4.671 4.048 
P-value  [0.205] [0.214] [0.022] [0.025] [0.885] [0.863] [0.049] [0.064] [0.316] [0.373] [0.322] [0.399] 
Adjusted R² 0.170 0.172 0.193 0.194 0.597 0.594 0.284 0.283 0.186 0.184 0.208 0.210 
Fisher  7.354*** 7.100*** 7.842*** 7.573*** 77.850*** 70.290*** 12.278*** 11.499*** 8.630*** 8.119*** 7.481*** 7.132*** 
Observations s 362 362 352 352 370 370 370 370 369 369 370 370 
             
 Panel C: Fixed Effects with HAC 
 Control of Corruption Government  Effectiveness Voice & Accountability Political Stability Regulation Quality  Rule of  Law 
Constant -0.851*** -0.865*** -0.935*** -0.952*** -0.912*** -0.935*** -0.986*** -1.006*** -0804*** -0.817*** -0.983*** -1.001*** 
 (-12.98) (-12.85) (-14.49) (-14.11) (-16.70) (-15.80) (-9.394) (-9.386) (-9.385) (-8.975) (-13.56) (-13.60) 
Democracy  0.070*** --- 0.078*** --- 0.129*** --- 0.111*** --- 0.071*** --- 0.085*** --- 
 (4.098)  (4.558)  (11.05)  (5.895)  (4.270)  (4.786)  
Polity  --- 0.072*** --- 0.080*** --- 0.132*** --- 0.114*** --- 0.073*** --- 0.087*** 
  (4.140)  (4.574)  (11.14)  (5.937)  (4.212)  (4.853) 
Autocracy -0.006 0.068*** -0.009 0.074*** -0.062*** 0.075*** 0.039 0.158*** -0.0009 0.075*** 0.0008 0.092*** 
 (-0.343) (3.590) (-0.638) (4.494) (-5.330) (5.862) (1.498) (7.702) (-0.052) (3.070) (0.046) (4.728) 
Adjusted R² 0.248 0.251 0.303 0.305 0.665 0.664 0.275 0.276 0.252 0.251 0.311 0.315 
Fisher  72.425*** 73.807*** 92.591*** 93.544*** 439.224*** 437.161*** 85.027*** 85.087*** 75.272*** 75.089*** 100.867*** 102.750*** 
Observations  434 434 422 422 442 442 442 442 441 441 442 442 
             
Initial Instruments    Constant; Lower Middle Income; Middle Income; English; Christians; Free Press; Partly Free Press 
Robust Instruments  Constant; Upper Middle Income; Low Income; French; Islam; Not Free Press  
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. OIR: Overidentifying  Restrictions. 2SLS: Two-Stage-Least Squares. HAC: Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent.  
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4.4Further discussion and policy implications 
 We conduct our argument in this section in two strands, namely (i) closeness in the effect 
of democracy and autocracy and (ii) policy implications.  
 The first strand on closeness in the consequences has two main dimensions: difference 
effect and sign effect. On the one hand, concerning the difference effect, it is important to note 
that variations between democratic and autocratic elasticities are significant but not substantial 
enough to persuade autocratic regimes of the appeals of democracy in GQ. On the other hand, as 
regards the sign effect, elasticities of both political-regime types are positive. This is an 
indication that autocratic regimes are not as detrimental to  improving dimensions of  GQ as one 
might have expected. 
 In essence, the time and level hypotheses on the non-linear relationship between 
democracy and GQ could provide some insights into these closeness in  outcomes. The partiality 
or youthfulness of African democracies renders their  influences on GQ less pronounced. This is 
consistent with the level (Montinola and Jackman 2002; Back and Hadenius 2008; Sung 2004) 
and time of exposure (Keefer 2007) hypotheses.  
In the second strand, a key issue in political economy is to understand how institutional 
arrangements shape policy outcomes. From our findings, compared to autocracy, democracy is 
better at stimulating GQ. However, once initiated, the democratization process should be 
accelerated in order to avoid the trap of the appeals of autocracy. Early democracy should be 
complemented with complete freedom of the press so that the benefits in GQ are substantial. 
Early democracy has been documented to improve income levels through higher economic 
growth (Shen 2002).  In this light, it can be inferred from our findings that increased income 
levels accompanied with press-freedom policies would substantially improve democracy and 
GQ. As the country matures in the democratization process, it will benefit from the time and 
level of exposure advantages of democracy which will further improve the GQ and growth.  
From the underlying findings and perusal of the relevant literature, the pitfall of initiating 
democracy remains the failure to accelerate the process of democratization. As a policy 
implication, democracy, once initiated, should be hastened (to edge the appeals of authoritarian 
regimes) and reap the benefits of the time and level effect hypotheses. 
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In line with comparative religious instruments, based on relative religious elasticities of 
GQ, it appears that Christian-dominated countries will have an edge over their Moslem-oriented 
counterparts in the implementation of proposed recommendations.  
  
5. Conclusions and Further Directions 
This paper has examined nexuses between law, politics and the quality of government in 
Africa. We have investigated whether African democracies enjoy relatively better government 
quality compared to their counterparts with more autocratic inclinations. The empirical evidence 
is based on Instrumental variable Two-Stage-Least Squares and Fixed Effects with data from 38 
African countries for the period 1994-2010. Political regimes of democracy, polity and autocracy 
are instrumented with income levels, legal origins, religious dominations and press freedom 
levels to account for government, quality dynamics of corruption control, government 
effectiveness, voice and accountability, political-stability, regulation quality and the rule of law. 
The main findings indicate that democracy has an edge over autocracy while the latter and polity 
overlap. As a policy implication, democracy, once initiated, should be  speeded up in order to 
edge out the appeals of authoritarian regimes and to enjoy the benefits of time and level effect 
outcomes. 
 The above findings have contributed to the literature on the sequence of institutions at 
various stages of development. More specifically, the debate on whether political or economic 
institutions should be prioritized at the early stages of industrialization remains open. Reflecting 
our results in the light of the time and level hypotheses for the benefits of democracy, it is to 
reasonable to infer that they are more closely aligned with the strand of literature advocating that 
economic rights should precede political rights (Kramon 2009; Anyanwu and Erhijakpor 2014). 
This is essentially because we have established that democratic quality increases with income 
levels.  Future studies positioned on clarifying this inference with more macroeconomic 
variables would substantially improve the extant literature and enrich a recent stream of 
institutional literature on whether Africa’s recent growth resurgence is a reality or a myth (Fosu, 
2015b, Fosu, 2015c). Moreover, contingent on data availability, there are two ways in which the 
established linkages can be improved. First, the Fukuyama governance indicators could be 
adopted because they appear to be orthogonal to democratic quality advocated by the 
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Washington Consensus. Second, Leonardo Morlino’s framework for examining democratic 
quality (procedure, content and results) can also be employed. This approach has been recently 
employed by Nwokora and Pelizzo (2015) who have proposed an index of fluidity as a measure 
of party system change that captures the changeability of patterns of party competition. The 
proposition of the index is based on shortcomings in existing empirical approaches to capture the 
fact that changes in political systems may fail to reflect the extent of competition within political 
parties. The analytical procedure is consistent with Morlino’s analytical framework of procedure, 
content and results.   
 
 
 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Sign Variable Definitions Sources 
    
Democracy  Demo Institutionalized Democracy  World Bank(WDI) 
    
Polity  Pol Revised Combined  Polity Score  World Bank(WDI) 
    
Autocracy  Auto Institutionalized Autocracy  World Bank(WDI) 
    
Public  Investment  PubI Gross Public Investment(% of GDP) World Bank(WDI) 
    
Population growth  Popg Average annual population growth rate  World Bank(WDI) 
    
Growth of GDP GDPg Average annual GDP growth rate World Bank(WDI) 
    
Control of Corruption  CC Control of Corruption(estimate) World Bank(WDI) 
    
Government Effectiveness Gov. E Government Effectiveness(estimate) World Bank(WDI) 
    
Political Stability/ No Violence  PolS Political Stability/ No Violence (estimate) World Bank(WDI) 
    
Regulation Quality  R.Q Regulation Quality (estimate) World Bank(WDI) 
    
Rule of Law R.L Rule of Law(estimate) World Bank(WDI) 
    
Voice and Accountability  V & A Voice and Accountability (estimate) World Bank(WDI) 
    
Press Freedom  Free Freedom House Index  Freedom House 
    
WDI: World Development Indicators  
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Appendix 2: Summary Statistics 
 Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Observations 
 
 
Government 
Quality  
 
 
Control of Corruption  -0.622 0.597 -2.489 1.086 445 
Government Effectiveness -0.691 0.598 -1.853 0.807 433 
Political Stability  -0.543 0.922 -3.056 1.108 454 
Regulation Quality  -0.580 0.577 -2.526 0.905 453 
Rule of Law -0.692 0.647 -2.312 1.053 454 
Voice and Accountability  -0.589 0.721 -1.951 1.047 454 
       
Democracy 
 
 
Autocracy 
Democracy Index 2.725 4.214 -8.000 10.000 627 
Polity Index(Revised) 1.068 5.312 -9.000 10.000 627 
 
Autocracy Index  1.703 3.460 -8.000 9.000 627 
       
 
Control 
Variables 
GDP growth  4.816 6.725 -50.248 71.188 644 
Population growth  2.485 0.948 -6.526 10.043 644 
Public Investment  7.543 4.200 0.000 32.032 564 
       
 
 
 
 
 
Instrumental 
Variables 
English Common-Law 0.394 0.489 0.000 1.000 646 
French Civil-Law  0.605 0.489 0.000 1.000 646 
Christianity  0.710 0.453 0.000 1.000 646 
Islam  0.289 0.453 0.000 1.000 646 
Low Income  0.631 0.482 0.000 1.000 646 
Middle Income 0.368 0.482 0.000 1.000 646 
Lower Middle Income  0.236 0.425 0.000 1.000 646 
Upper Middle Income  0.131 0.338 0.000 1.000 646 
Press Freedom 0.136 0.343 0.000 1.000 570 
Partial Press Freedom 0.384 0.486 0.000 1.000 570 
No Press Freedom 0.478 0.500 0.000 1.000 570 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min : Minimum. Max : Maximum.  
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Appendix 3: Correlation Analysis      
Quality of Government Democracy Control Variables Instrumental Variables  
CC Gov.E PolS R.Q R.L V&A Demo Pol Auto GDPg Popg PubI Eng. Frch. Chris Islam LI MI LMI UMI Free PFree NFree  
1.000 0.872 0.668 0.774 0.86 0.747 0.500 0.40 -0.03 -0.068 -0.34 0.200 0.274 -0.274 0.024 -0.12 -0.22 0.222 -0.024 0.345 0.518 0.094 -0.465 CC 
 1.000 0.667 0.851 0.89 0.796 0.551 0.45 -0.05 -0.006 -0.31 0.178 0.406 -0.406 0.080 -0.16 -0.31 0.310 0.006 0.422 0.558 0.116 -0.519 Gov. E 
  1.000 0.657 0.78 0.684 0.509 0.30 0.141 0.021 -0.22 0.287 0.145 -0.145 0.025 -0.11 -0.14 0.141 -0.113 0.345 0.427 0.136 -0.437 PolS 
   1.000 0.82 0.760 0.505 0.39 -0.00 -0.055 -0.26 0.067 0.385 -0.385 0.082 -0.12 -0.16 0.168 -0.114 0.383 0.502 0.160 -0.514 R..Q 
    1.00 0.799 0.561 0.43 0.003 -0.017 -0.31 0.229 0.361 -0.361 0.031 -0.14 -0.20 0.203 -0.086 0.398 0.536 0.113 -0.492 R.L 
     1.000 0.763 0.77 -0.29 -0.049 -0.26 0.128 0.270 -0.270 -0.01 -0.08 -0.08 0.089 -0.126 0.286 0.645 0.293 -0.745 V&A 
      1.000 0.73 0.056 0.0341 -0.13 0.241 0.220 -0.220 0.049 -0.04 -0.01 0.018 -0.191 0.257 0.477 0.226 -0.543 Demo 
       1.00 -0.63 -0.069 -0.15 0.182 0.147 -0.147 0.105 -0.10 0.051 -0.051 -0.224 0.198 0.487 0.259 -0.582 Polity 
        1.00 0.149 0.070 0.019 0.043 -0.043 -0.09 0.098 -0.09 0.096 0.109 0.003 -0.16 -0.11 0.222 Auto 
         1.000 0.264 0.110 -0.03 0.035 0.011 -0.02 -0.08 0.088 -0.011 0.139 0.018 -0.05 0.036 GDPg 
          1.000 -0.04 -0.21 0.211 -0.10 0.153 0.322 -0.322 -0.178 -0.23 -0.24 0.063 0.107 Popg 
           1.000 -0.05 0.057 -0.08 -0.02 -0.01 0.012 0.020 -0.00 0.043 0.188 -0.212 PubI 
            1.000 -1.000 0.085 -0.04 -0.16 0.164 0.056 0.163 0.190 0.041 -0.170 English 
             1.000 -0.08 0.040 0.164 -0.164 -0.056 -0.16 -0.19 -0.04 0.170 French 
              1.000 -0.93 -0.04 0.049 -0.154 0.264 0.07 -0.10 0.054 Christian 
               1.000 0.126 -0.126 0.053 -0.24 -0.09 0.068 -0.000 Islam 
                1.000 -1.000 -0.729 -0.50 -0.17 0.109 0.011 LIncome 
                 1.000 0.729 0.50 0.17 -0.10 -0.011 MIncome 
                  1.000 -0.21 -0.17 0.001 0.118 LMI 
                   1.000 0.464 -0.15 -0.165 UMI 
                    1.000 -0.31 -0.381 Free 
                     1.000 -0.757 PFree 
                      1.000 NFree 
                        
CC: Control of Corruption.  Gov. E: Government Effectiveness. PolS: Political Stability or No Violence. R.Q: Regulation Quality. R.L: Rule of Law.  V& A: Voice and Accountability. Demo: Democracy. Pol: Polity. Auto: 
Autocracy. GDPg: GDP growth. Popg: Population growth. PubI: Public Investment. Eng: English Common-Law. Frch: French Civil-Law. Chris: Christian Religion. LI: Low Income. MI: Middle Income. LMI: Lower Middle 
Income. UMI: Upper Middle Income. Free: Freedom of the Press. PFree: Partial Freedom of the Press. NFree: No Freedom of the Press.  
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Appendix 4: Presentation of Countries 
Instruments Instrument Category Countries Num. 
 
Legal-origins  
English Common-Law Botswana, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, 
Swaziland,  Uganda, Zambia, Tanzania. 
15 
   
French Civil-Law  Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Republic, Congo  
Democratic Republic, Ivory Coast, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Guinea-Bissau,  Madagascar,  Mali, Mauritania, 
Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo.  
 
23 
    
 
Religions  
 
 
Christianity  
Angola, Benin ,Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, 
Central African Republic, Congo Republic, Congo  Democratic 
Republic, Ivory Coast, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, 
Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Rwanda, South Africa, Swaziland, Togo, Uganda, 
Zambia, Tanzania. 
 
27 
   
Islam  Burkina Faso, Chad, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau,   Mali, 
Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan. 
11 
    
 
 
Income Levels 
Low Income  Benin ,Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad,  
Congo Republic, Congo  Democratic Republic, Ethiopia, The 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi,  
Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda,  Sierra Leone, 
Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Tanzania.  
 
24 
   
Middle Income Angola ,Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Lesotho, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, 
South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland. 
14 
   
Lower Middle Income  Angola, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Nigeria, 
Sudan, Swaziland. 
8 
   
Upper Middle Income  Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Mauritius, South Africa.  5 
    
Num: Number of cross sections(countries) 
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